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TREND IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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11 JULY 1973

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
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


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11 JULY 1973
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INDOCHINA

North Vietnam's party-government delegation, led by First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong, arrived in Moscow on 9 July and opened their "official friendly visit" on the following day with talks with the top Kremlin leaders and a welcoming luncheon given by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev. The tone for the visit was set in speeches at the luncheon, with Brezhnev subordinating the question of Vietnam to Moscow's broad detente policy and offering scant support for the Vietnamese visitors. While Brezhnev did not comment on the source of continuing problems in Indochina, Le Duan charged that the United States and Saigon have violated military and political provisions of the peace agreement and condemned U.S. bombing in Cambodia.

The party-government visit to Moscow comes five weeks after a similar week-long sojourn in Peking, both characterized by the DRV leaders as missions to express gratitude for assistance to the Vietnamese cause. During the Peking visit an agreement on PRC gratuitous economic and military assistance to Vietnam for 1974 was concluded. Pham Van Dong has recently paid visits to Mongolia and North Korea during which aid agreements were concluded, and the premier will evidently continue on a similar tour of East Europe: VNA on 11 July carried a DRV Foreign Ministry announcement that Dong, "in the near future," would pay an official friendship visit to Hungary.

LE DUAN BEGINS VISIT IN USSR, BREZHNEV PRESSES DETENTE POLICY

The North Vietnamese party-government delegation was greeted upon its arrival in Moscow by an impressive leadership turnout, including Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, Gromyko, and Grechko. These same leaders, along with Katushev, participated in the talks which opened on the 10th in an "atmosphere of fraternal friendship, mutual understanding, and cordiality." The DRV delegation, in addition to Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, included Politburo member and aid expert Le Thanh Nghi, North Vietnamese Ambassador Vo Thuc Dong, Minister and Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission Nguyen Van Kha, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, and Deputy Minister of Defense Maj. Gen. Tran Sam. Le Thanh Nghi, who has frequently headed DRV delegations abroad to conclude annual aid agreements, also was

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a member of the delegations which recently visited China, Mongolia, and North Korea. These earlier delegations included a deputy minister of foreign trade, rather than planning, but otherwise had a similar composition.

The "official friendly visit" is the first such North Vietnamese party-government visit to Moscow since October 1969 when Pham Van Dong made trips to both China and the Soviet Union as part of Hanoi's campaign, following Ho Chi Minh's death in September, to implement the appeal in Ho's last will and testament for harmony among socialist countries. Le Duan last headed a party-government delegation to the Soviet Union in April 1965, for what was labeled a "friendship" visit. Le Duan also visited the Soviet Union in November 1967 when he accompanied Ho Chi Minh to the 50th October Revolution anniversary celebration, in April 1970 for the Lenin centennial, and most recently in April 1971 when he attended the 24th CPSU Congress.

OPENING SPEECHES The exchange of speeches by Brezhnev and Le Duan at a 10 July luncheon honoring the North Vietnamese First Secretary contained some standard and predictable elements. Thus, Brezhnev praised the Vietnamese "victory" in the war and Le Duan offered warm thanks for Soviet "many-sided support" and "extensive and valuable help." And both advocated the strengthening of ties between the two countries as well as international communist solidarity. But the speeches were striking in their divergence regarding the world scene. Brezhnev advocated the subordination of all issues to Moscow's broad detente policy with the West while Le Duan explicitly assailed U.S. policies in Indochina and reminded the Soviets of their obligations to the world revolution.

Brezhnev made clear that the Vietnam problem was in direct contradiction to the Soviet detente policy when he observed that the war there "was not and could not be merely a regional matter." He added that it affected the interests of other states, that its consequences affected world politics, and that the "aggression" against a socialist state "largely blocked the road to the improvement of the international atmosphere."

Brezhnev seemed to dramatize Soviet concern over continued military action in Indochina by a pointed interjection regarding socialist opposition to the export of revolution and counterrevolution. After stressing the importance of "all sides" completely and strictly fulfilling the Paris agreement, he asserted that the

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imposition of its "own rules on anyone is alien to the socialist countries" and that "revolutions are not to be exported." This juxtaposition could be read as an implicit warning to the Vietnamese in view of the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia. While adding the traditional stance that "we are always fighting against export of counterrevolution," he did not mention foreign assistance in this connection, thus essentially diminishing the traditional thrust of his formulation as a justification for assistance to national liberation movements.

The injunction against the export of revolution has in the past been a minor qualifier in the course of a defense of Soviet assistance to foreign struggles against "counterrevolution" and it has been in this context that Brezhnev has previously used it. Thus, for example, the General Secretary raised the question in an August 1969 article in PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM in the course of justifying Soviet support for peoples fighting against imperialism.

Le Duan for his part noted the role of the Soviet Union in supporting the world revolution. He observed that the Soviet's "mighty economic and military potential" allow it to "play a particularly important role in the struggle of peoples for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism." And he wished the Soviets successes in building communism, defending world peace, and "giving help to the world revolutionary movement in accordance with the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress."

Despite obvious North Vietnamese reservations about Soviet-U.S. detente, Brezhnev in his speech stressed the "big steps" that had been taken since the 24th CPSU Congress toward "further consolidation of international security." As examples he cited the recently signed agreement with the United States on the prevention of nuclear war and the Helsinki conference on European security. Although Hanoi media had duly reported the agreements concluded during Brezhnev's visit to the United States and the holding of the Helsinki conference, there has been no North Vietnamese comment on these issues and Le Duan did not mention them in his luncheon speech.

Brezhnev attached "great significance" to the normalization of the situation in Southeast Asia and Asia in order to achieve "global" detente. He acknowledged outstanding problems in the area by mildly noting the resistance of "reactionary forces" to democratic changes in South Vietnam and the reunification of the North and

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South, "obstacles" to implementation of the Laos agreement, and the continuing fighting in Cambodia. And he went on to make a pitch for the Soviet proposal for an Asian security system, stating that the restoration of peace in Indochina will create preconditions for "specific steps" to consolidate security in Asia and to establish good relations among all Asian states "without any exceptions." In his speech last December on the USSR 50th anniversary, Brezhnev was more direct in specifically stating that China too should be a part of an Asian collective security system.

Typically, Le Duan did not respond to Brezhnev's discussion of collective security, and he clearly demonstrated North Vietnam's dissatisfaction with the Soviet's view of the remaining problems in Indochina. Thus he charged that the United States and Saigon have "engaged in serious and systematic violations of the most important military and political provisions of the agreement" and pointedly noted that these violations involve North as well as South Vietnam. Le Duan affirmed that the Vietnamese are "waging a determined struggle against all these intrigues" and went on to demand that the United States and Saigon observe the Paris agreement and the 13 June joint communique and reply to the PRG's six-point proposal of 28 June. The PRG's six-point program for a settlement of issues in South Vietnam has not been endorsed by Moscow and was not mentioned by Brezhnev. Le Duan also directly scored U.S. bombing in Cambodia and supported the "Lao peoples'" demand for the United States and the Vientiane administration to strictly observe the Lao agreement.

AID Brezhnev seemed to be closing the ledger on Soviet aid to Vietnam with the announcement at the conclusion of his speech that the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government have decided to regard all the previous assistance to the Vietnamese as "given free." Reports on Soviet-DRV aid agreements during the past war years have not always indicated that the aid was non-refundable and the timing of Brezhnev's announcement suggests that the Soviets may have deliberately left the question of possible repayment unresolved until they could be sure that Hanoi was ending the war.

Brezhnev did not make clear what the form of future aid would be. He said that the current talks with the delegation would make possible the elevation of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship to a new level and would "extend the scope of our cooperation in all major fields." He also advocated "extensive, fruitful, and systematic contacts" between the two parties, close contact between public organizations, and "full-scale economic cooperation," adding that the Soviet people "understand" Vietnamese concern to rehabilitate their economy, improve living standards, and advance culture and

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Pointedly indicating that Hanoi must seek assistance in other countries as well, Brezhnev also expressed confidence that the DRV will accomplish its tasks while relying on internationalist support from "all socialist states." In a 30 January speech during a visit with DRV leaders Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh, Brezhnev had referred even more broadly to aid from countries regardless of their social systems.

Soviet comment taking note of the anticipated arrival of the Le Duan delegation had stressed Soviet-Vietnamese solidarity and fraternity and the "significant" role of Soviet aid in the "historic victory" of the Vietnamese people. In addition commentators noted continuing Soviet assistance to the DRV to rehabilitate its economy and consolidate peace.

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PHAM VAN DONG TRIPS TO MONGOLIA, DPRK YIELD AID AGREEMENTS

The visits of the North Vietnamese delegation, led by Pham Van Dong, to Mongolia (22-26 June) and North Korea (26 June-1 July) followed the pattern of the earlier Le Duan-Pham Van Dong trip to China: The North Vietnamese guests were cordially received by top-level party and government officials, including party chiefs Tsedenbal and Kim Il-sung, were honored at rallies and banquets where affirmations of international solidarity with Vietnam were voiced, and they concluded "gratuitous" aid agreements.* During each of the three visits, the North Vietnamese made a point of stressing that a major purpose of the trips was to thank their allies for support received during the war--expressions of thanks that they noted were in accordance with Ho Chi Minh's behest in his will. While the Chinese agreement referred to military as well as economic assistance, both the Mongolian one and the agreement signed in Pyongyang cited only economic aid. The North Korean agreement, like the Chinese, covered only 1974, but that with Mongolia was for 1974 and 1975.

There were themes common to all of the communiques on the three visits--such as the joint endorsement of the PRG as the "sole" legal representative of the South Vietnamese people. The communiques with Mongolia and Korea reported that on problems raised in the talks a "unanimity of views" had been reached--a statement that was absent from the communique with China. Despite the claim of "unanimity," North Vietnamese differences with its allies over questions related to U.S. foreign policy and the situation in Indochina were reflected in speeches during Pham Van Dong's visit in Ulan Bator, as they had been during the earlier visit in Peking. Mongolian spokesmen were somewhat more vocal than the Chinese leaders in demanding U.S. withdrawal from Indochina; they otherwise generally followed the soft line toward the United States of their Soviet mentor. Party chief Tsedenbal even went so far as to use the forum of a 22 June banquet for Pham Van Dong to praise Brezhnev's concurrent visit to the United States as helping to consolidate "peace and universal security." Reflecting DRV reserve regarding big-power summitry, VNA omitted this passage from its report on Tsedenbal's speech. Pyongyang and Peking offered specific support for the positions of their allies in Laos and Cambodia, but Mongolia sidestepped endorsement of Sihanouk's front and his five-point negotiating stand, reflecting its lack of relations with Sihanouk in conformity with the Soviet position.

* The China visit (4-11 June) is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 June 1973, pages 1-3, and 13 June 1973, pages 1-7.

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Only the North Koreans adopted a harsh anti-U.S. line consistent with Hanoi's usual position, underlining the two nations' community of interest as Asian communist states whose basic national aspirations remain obstructed by the United States. Thus, the DRV-DPRK communique hailed their "anti-U.S. common struggle," while Pyongyang assailed the United States for "scheming to keep its neocolonialism in South Vietnam."

The North Vietnamese used the summit meetings to reaffirm their pledge to continue to strive for communist unity, although they did not recall Ho Chi Minh's behest to this effect in his will. Pyongyang stressed its backing for unity first and foremost against U.S. "imperialism" while Ulan Bator more vaguely voiced support for solidarity against unspecified "imperialism." Peking had typically ignored the question of communist unity, warned against both "imperialism and hegemonism," and used the opportunity of the visit to score Moscow's detente policy.

CHINA'S DIFFERENCES WITH SIHANOUK EVIDENT AT PEKING BANQUET

At a time of Sino-U.S. contacts and reports of international moves regarding a Cambodian settlement, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Cambodian Prince Sihanouk offered notably different assessments of the current situation in their speeches at a 6 July banquet in Peking welcoming Sihanouk upon his return from a two-month foreign tour. Sihanouk condemned the Nixon Administration's military actions and position on peace negotiations, reaffirmed a hard position on a peace settlement, and appealed for military aid. By contrast, Chou made no reference to Washington's position on negotiations, softpedaled criticism of U.S. military actions, and moderated Chinese public support for the Cambodian struggle. The banquet, described as held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere," was as usual attended by a high-level Chinese leadership turnout including every active Peking-based Politburo member with the exceptions of Madame Mao and Chang Chun-chiao.*

* Chang's absence is notable inasmuch as he usually attends such functions dealing with Indochina. He had earlier failed to make his customary appearance to escort Le Duc Tho during his 24-25 June layover in Peking but subsequently was noted as present during the 8 July stopover of the DRV Party-Government delegation on its way to Moscow.

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The banquet for Sihanouk was on the same day that PRC Liaison Office chief Huang Chen had a meeting with President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger at San Clemente. Two days after the fact the meeting was reported in a straightforward NCNA dispatch which noted that it was held "at the invitation of the U.S. Government" but made no reference to topics discussed. By contrast, VNA promptly acknowledged the San Clemente meeting in a dispatch on the 7th which cited UPI for the report that Dr. Kissinger plans to go to Peking in August. Peking has yet to mention Kissinger's planned trip.

CHOU'S POSITION Speaking first as host at the Peking banquet, Chou hailed the "complete success" of Sihanouk's trip abroad, asserted that the prince had spread the happy tidings of the "excellent situation" and the "new outlook" of the liberated zone in Cambodia, and routinely noted that the trip had raised further the international standing of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) and his government (RGNU). In this connection, Chou noted that about 40 countries now recognize the RGNU as the "sole legal government of Cambodia;" he did not repeat the strong, direct endorsement of RGNU's position which he had offered in a similar speech at a 12 April banquet welcoming Sihanouk's return from a visit to the Cambodian liberated areas.

Chou also skirted all references to the U.S. position on negotiations concerning Cambodia, and regarding U.S. bombing said merely that it was arousing "strong opposition." By contrast, Chou had directly condemned the U.S. bombing in his April speech as well as on earlier occasions. A further measure of his current circumspection toward the United States was evident in his singling out only Saigon in connection with the Vietnam peace agreement; he claimed that the Saigon administration was incessantly violating the agreement and had threatened military intervention in Cambodia. Chou also denounced the "traitorous Lon Nol clique" for its alleged intention to introduce "mercenaries from Thailand" into Cambodia. While castigating the Lon Nol regime, Chou followed the recent pattern of avoiding criticism of the other three Phnom Penh government chiefs by name.

Expressing confidence that the Cambodians will advance to victory regardless of the amount of outside assistance provided to Lon Nol, Chou diluted past pledges of Chinese support for the Cambodian struggle and for Sihanouk's negotiating stance. Asserting that the Chinese and Cambodians are comrades-in-arms and brothers "standing together in times of need," he offered only a generalized

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pledge to "resolutely support" the Cambodian "just struggle." He observed that Sihanouk's five-point negotiating stance has "pointed out the clear direction" for a settlement, but the only specific issue he supported directly was Sihanouk's demand that the United States stop its bombing and military intervention. In this connection, the premier avoided repeating the heretofore routine demand in Peking's own name that the United States halt such actions.

SIHANOUK'S STANCE Thanking the Chinese for their support of his mission abroad, Sihanouk declared that Peking is his movement's "No. 1 supporter." But his vociferous defense of the interests of his cause was in marked contrast to Chou's bland remarks. He denounced President Nixon by name for the U.S. "air raids of genocide" and for alleged U.S. plans to employ Saigon and Thai forces to support Lon Nol after the 15 August deadline for an end to U.S. military action in Indochina. Warning particularly against the "perfidious propaganda and lies of U.S. imperialism and its chief, an 'old fox,'" that are designed to place the blame for the continuing conflict on the FUNK, Sihanouk asserted that his movement would never accept an "American peace" that would stop short of total liberation of Cambodia, involve the dissolution of the RGNU, or entail a cease-fire in place and partition of the country. In this connection he appealed to nations abroad not to "fall into the trap laid by the propaganda machine of President Richard Nixon" which claims that "very active negotiations are under way" to reach a Cambodian agreement. Denouncing the "hypocrisy" of U.S. claims regarding negotiations and portraying as American accomplices "another superpower" and "a West European country" (presumably France), Sihanouk gave notice that Cambodia would not follow the example of Czechoslovakia during the Munich conference but would fight to the end.

In the first authoritative acknowledgment by an insurgent spokesman since before the Vietnam agreement of military weakness within the FUNK, Sihanouk asserted that the fighters on the front line lack ammunition and appealed for military aid from abroad. He affirmed that the FUNK will in any case continue fighting if necessary with primitive weapons for "three years or 10 years or 20 years or even longer" in order to achieve their "just demands."

On the critical settlement question, Sihanouk staked out a hard position, asserting that the "only solution" was a complete cessation of U.S. and allied military interference and total withdrawal from Cambodia and the complete elimination of the

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"traitorous, illegal, anti-national, anti-popular, fascist, and utterly corrupt 'Khmer Republic.'" (Earlier, Sihanouk had denounced by name the four leading members of the regime.) Significantly, the prince made no mention of his past calls for bilateral negotiations with Washington. But he may have signaled an unpropitious stance on this score when he affirmed, in appealing for military assistance, that "U.S. imperialism does not understand and will never understand anything other than the language of force." His position on a settlement was reinforced by a RGNU Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 6th, released by AKI on the 9th, which pledged to continue struggle "without compromise or retreat" to drive out the United States and its allies and "to annihilate their Phnom Penh sublackeys, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Than-In Tam-Cheng Heng traitors."

There has thus far been no authoritative echo of Sihanouk's remarks on a lack of ammunition and arms. Neither the Vietnamese communists nor the Chinese have shown evidence of support for the appeal. Recent Peking coverage in fact has given the impression that the insurgents are quite capable of victory without outside aid. A 7 July NCNA pickup from AKI highlighted confidence that U.S. bombing would have little effect on the insurgents' fighting ability, while a pickup on the 8th played up the success of the Cambodian guerrillas in using "people's war" techniques including the employment of "simple and homemade weapons to defeat the puppet Phnom Penh forces armed with up-to-date U.S. weapons."

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DRV MEDIA DISCUSS PROBLEMS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

In recent weeks Hanoi media have revealed dissatisfaction with the pace of economic reconstruction, indicating that fairly serious problems exist in the areas of labor discipline, quality control, and resource management. This dissatisfaction has probably been intensified by a disappointing spring harvest, with shortfalls not only in rice but in secondary industrial crops. There has been no sign in the media, however, that a comprehensive reconstruction plan has been drawn up to shore up the economy; instead the economy seems to be operating under the guidance of a few basic slogans calling for rapid reconstruction of existing facilities and building up the means of production.

Recent stress on quality control derives from a Truong Chinh talk at the Hanoi machine-building plant on 29 April in which he noted problems of labor discipline and productivity and warned that making a poor product was more wasteful than making none at all. Truong Chinh's talk, published in the June issue of HOC TAP, was amplified by Le Thanh Nghi in a NHAN DAN article broadcast in installments from 19 to 23 June. Nghi proposed that quality be insured by a series of positive and negative incentives, ranging from awarding medals and money to workers and enterprises with high standards to penalizing producers of poor quality goods by forcing them to "bear responsibility for compensating for the production costs of these products."

An article on enterprise management in the same issue of HOC TAP detailed some of the current problems confronting factories where, according to the article, "there are few people who work well and to the best of their ability." The article stated that recent successes have been mitigated by "numerous shortcomings" in management and that regulations "governing production discipline and labor discipline were seriously violated and sometimes overthrown." Raw materials have been reportedly lost or held back in some enterprises and the utilization of equipment has been reduced to "approximately 50 percent" with some places using only 30 to 40 percent. The article pointed out that this situation offers opportunities for rapid increases in production, but implied that most enterprises are now operating without sufficient planning as to goals, raw materials supplies, or coordination of effort. With raw materials scarce and some machinery still in dispersal sites, some plants are "reserving too much material" while formulating plans, an attempt by factory managers to hoard raw materials in the face of an inadequate transportation system.

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The article criticized the labor force in caustic terms, bemoaning the presence of "dishonest or unqualified" personnel and "lazy" workers attempting to avoid responsibility. To remedy this situation, the article revealed, new incentives will be introduced, involving cash prizes to workers overfulfilling norms and maintaining qualitative standards. The piecework system is also to be fully restored and extended to allow compensation according to performance. A 22 June NHAN DAN editorial strongly reiterated this view, stating that "the system of conducting wages according to productivity has many advantages compared with the system of paying wages according to working time." The editorial stated that localities which have implemented the system of payment according to productivity have shown progress in improving workers' attitudes and skills, but that some enterprises have resisted the system because it "engenders countless complicated tasks" and complicates management. The editorial also complained about the prevailing tendency among plant directors to set work norms at low levels in order to please the workers, resulting in payment of high wages without increased performance.

The description of the current economic situation by DRV media has not been entirely bleak. A 9 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, for instance, viewed the semiannual economic successes optimistically in a brief survey ranging from rice cultivation to coal shaft digging. However, such optimism has usually been qualified, as in an 8 July Hanoi broadcast which hailed 17 Hanoi enterprises for meeting half-year plans, but noted that "more than half" failed to meet plans.

AGRICULTURE Hanoi media have generally treated this year's spring crop failures sympathetically, but dissatisfaction has been expressed over the cultivation of secondary industrial crops and the performance of certain districts in scheduling rice planting. According to a 30 July Hanoi broadcast, spring grain yields were some six percent under last year, a result accepted by a NHAN DAN editorial on 4 July as "fairly satisfactory" in view of the weather, but less so considering that last year's crop was harvested under U.S. bombing. The editorial also criticized certain districts for incorrectly scheduling rice planting, for insufficient drought preparation, and for conducting reaping too slowly.

A 10 July NHAN DAN editorial called for greater attention to secondary crop production, stating that "since 1968 secondary crop production has shown a tendency to gradually decrease." While acknowledging the deleterious effects of weather, the editorial

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placed the main responsibility on the "organization and guidance of agricultural production" which have overstressed rice cultivation, provided insufficient material and technical bases for production, and have not provided for necessary processing plants. The editorial called for overcoming these tendencies and for reeducating the peasants, who "are not eager to grow secondary crops" except when the rice crop fails.

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KIRILENKO VISIT REFLECTS TENSIONS IN SOVIET-ARAB RELATIONS

The first opportunity for high-level Soviet-Arab consultations since Brezhnev's U.S. visit came with the 3-9 July visit to Syria by a Soviet party-government delegation, headed by Kirilenko, which attended ceremonies on the first stage of the Euphrates hydropower project. Concern to counter Arab skepticism over U.S.-Soviet detente and its implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict was again indicated by Kirilenko's assurances of Moscow's unswerving support for the Arabs and his reiteration of the Soviet stand on full Israeli withdrawal and regard for Palestinian "rights." At the same time, taking the Euphrates diversion as a symbol, Moscow has suggested that the Arabs should not focus on a military "rebuff" to their enemies but would do better to concentrate on developing themselves economically and socially and improving Arab cooperation.

The absence thus far of the customary communique on Kirilenko's visit* would seem to indicate that he was less than successful in convincing the Syrians of the steadfastness of Soviet support. Kirilenko was apparently not invited to address the Euphrates dam ceremony on 5 July, and Damascus radio, while giving the visit adequate coverage, failed to report some of his activities and remarks at various functions. Damascus may have been miffed that Kosygin did not lead the Soviet delegation.** His attendance at the Euphrates ceremony would seem to have been a balance to his presence in Iraq in April 1972 for the commissioning of the Northern ar-Rumaylah oilfield. But on the other hand, the primary purpose of that visit was the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi friendship and cooperation treaty; Syria has reportedly resisted Soviet approaches for a similar treaty.

Moscow began preparing a buildup for the Euphrates diversion as far back as mid-May, when broadcasts in Arabic began inviting

* At least once in the past there was an unusual and unexplained delay in the release of a Soviet-Syrian communique: The statement on the 20-26 January 1967 visit of a Ba'ath delegation led by Salah Jadid to Moscow was not released until 11 February.

** There were Beirut press rumors to this effect in mid-June, despite the fact that Vienna media had already noted that Kosygin would be visiting Austria in early July.

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listeners to participate in a forthcoming radio "symposium" on the event. Such a program, however, has still not been monitored. Propaganda in June, like that accompanying the delegation's visit, extolled the future benefits to Syria of the Euphrates hydropower complex--described as "the twin of Aswan"--and praised it as an example of Soviet-Arab friendship and cooperation.

KIRILENKO REMARKS In his major speech during the visit, at a Damascus banquet on 3 July, Kirilenko reaffirmed the "consistent and unshakable" Soviet attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, "firmly demanding" Israeli withdrawal and the insuring of the "rights and legitimate interests" of the Arab peoples, including the Palestinians. Without specifically mentioning the U.S.-Soviet summit talks, he underscored the "important positive developments" in the international situation opening the way toward detente. According to TASS, he did touch on Moscow's stance in the summit talks in a Damascus television address on the 8th; he reportedly said that in discussing the Middle East problem at the talks in the United States, the Soviet side expressed "firm and invariable support for the just struggle" of the Arabs for liberation of their lands. And he called it "of considerable importance" that the U.S.-Soviet communique "placed on the record" the desire for a Middle East settlement insuring the rights and interests of the Palestinians.

Kirilenko concluded, TASS said, by noting that forces pretending to be friends of the Arabs would like to isolate them from the USSR and that they spread "concoctions and lies" about the Soviet policy.* In a speech at a 5 July dinner in Aleppo Kirilenko also had called for vigilance against enemies of the Arab peoples trying to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship.

RADIO COMMENT Moscow propaganda pegged to the Kirilenko visit, as well as other comment broadcast in Arabic since the Brezhnev visit, has attempted to shore up the USSR's image in Arab eyes. In the first of a series of talks, Soviet

* Moscow radio gave considerable publicity to the television address in foreign-language broadcasts. But Damascus radio, while reporting Kirilenko's remarks to Syrian journalists at the radio-television premises, made no mention of a television address and did not include his reference to "lies" about Soviet policy.

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Journalist Makalimov on the 10th began analyzing for Arab listeners the effect of the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations on the USSR's Middle East policy. He divided the Arabs into three groups--those who approve the process of improving big-power relations, those who are "misled" and fear it, and those who think they can profit from big-power contradictions. In the weekly Moscow domestic service observers' roundtable on the 8th, Belyayev asserted that Moscow's actions in connection with further improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations can--"as representatives of Arab states believe"--help settle the Middle East crisis. Belyayev also viewed the Euphrates project and Kirilenko's affirmation of Soviet support for the Arabs as "the best answer to all those doubts which occasionally appear in the Arab press."

A commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 10th, citing Kirilenko's Damascus TV remarks, stressed the "vital necessity" of the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement. And an Arabic-language commentary on the 5th, responding to Arab press emphasis on self-reliance in the wake of the summit, criticized "certain quarters in Arab countries" for advocating the "formula of so-called self-dependence" spread by "imperialist quarters." This commentary in effect cautioned the Arabs against the notion they could defeat Israeli militarily, arguing that there had been instances in the past "when military supremacy could not always achieve the desired victory over the enemy when this victory is subject to political and economic influence." It called the USSR's military assistance to the Arabs an important factor, but pointed out that the Soviet Union was also providing substantial assistance in the "decisive fields" of social and economic construction.

SOVIET-SYRIAN TALKS Kirilenko's program included a meeting with President al-Asad on the 7th--which lasted seven hours, according to Damascus radio--at which he presented a letter from Brezhnev and had what TASS called a "frank exchange of views" on further development of Soviet-Syrian relations and on topical international issues, with "special attention" to the Middle East situation. Kirilenko may also have discussed Syrian-Lebanese tensions in the wake of the Lebanese-Palestinian clashes in May, since he followed up the Syrian visit with one to Lebanon made, according to a Beirut press report, at his request. Al-Asad had had talks in Moscow at the time the conflict in Lebanon erupted, when he paid a "secret visit" reported a week later by Cairo and Beirut papers.

Kirilenko also had talks with Ba'th Party Regional Command Assistant

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Secretary Bajbul, who hosted the welcoming dinner for the delegation on the 3d, and met for "friendly" talks with the prime minister and foreign minister. He discussed CPSU-Ba'th relations with Ba'th Party officials and held a meeting with leaders of the quarreling Syrian Communist Party to discuss its activities and "the strengthening of its organizational and ideological unity." The only mention of any economic discussions during the visit came in a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY dispatch from Damascus which reported the opening on the 7th of "preliminary talks" to prepare for a "series of talks" on Soviet-Syrian economic and trade relations. President al-Asad, speaking at the Euphrates ceremony, praised the USSR for "meeting its obligations in all matters" connected with the project and called the Euphrates dam a symbol of what relations between states should be.

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U. S. - C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

PRAGUE URGES FURTHER AGREEMENTS FOLLOWING CONSULAR ACCORD

Speaking at a Prague airport ceremony on the departure of Secretary of State Rogers on 9 July, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek declared that the "decisive" influence of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks on the overall international situation had created "good prerequisites for the successful development" of U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. He called the consular agreement just concluded between the two countries "a good start" and expressed the hope that it would be followed by settlement of other issues. In particular, he was optimistic about the prospects for the talks on questions of property scheduled to start on 10 September and those on scientific and cultural cooperation planned for the second half of October.

Chnoupek was lavish in his praise of the consular agreement at the signing earlier on the 9th, predicting also that Rogers' visit would "contribute to the gradual solution of all outstanding problems" between the two states. Deputy Foreign Minister Ruzek was more guarded in a press conference after the signing ceremony in which he was reported by CTK to have said that the adjustment of bilateral "property" questions and the completion of commercial and other agreements "would require some time."

Prague reports of the signing and departure ceremonies concluded with brief summaries of Rogers' remarks. At the signing, the Secretary was reported to have called the consular agreement "an important milestone" in the two countries' relations, in keeping with the "atmosphere of the successfully concluded debates" at Helsinki. On his departure he was quoted by the Prague domestic service as having called the visit "the first successful step along the path to a new era" in U.S.-CSSR relations and as having expressed the hope that consulates would be opened in Chicago and Bratislava "in the not too distant future."

TASS carried brief reports on Secretary Rogers' visit, including his talks on the 9th with CPCZ General Secretary Husak and Premier Strougal, also attended by Ambassador Sherer and CSSR Ambassador to the United States Spacil. In reporting the talks, TASS omitted a passage in the Prague radio version which characterized the talks as marked by "frankness in the exchange of views" on promoting cooperation and "removing the existing obstacles hampering"

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bilateral relations. The TASS reports tended to treat the visit as an example of peaceful coexistence in action. NCNA on the 10th, citing CTK, briefly reported that Secretary Rogers had paid an official visit to the CSSR on the 8th and 9th at the invitation of the Czechoslovak Government and had signed a consular agreement. The report noted that Rogers was "the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit Czechoslovakia."

MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS Chnoupek in his airport speech indicated that progress in the bilateral talks scheduled for the fall should "clear the path" for a trade agreement based on the most-favored-nation principle. The demand for such an agreement had been voiced on the most authoritative level by Premier Strougal in an interview published in the Washington POST on 16 December 1972. In reporting the interview two days later, the Prague party daily RUDE PRAVO declared that Strougal had pointed out that "American official policy does not grant the CSSR the most-favored-nation clause" and that "without eliminating discrimination on the part of the United States, a good development of trade relations will not be possible."

RUDE PRAVO failed to mention Strougal's implicit offer to negotiate U.S. financial claims against Czechoslovakia in exchange for most-favored-nation status and his acknowledgment of "the role of the American and allied forces" in the liberation of the country in World War II. These themes, as well as a demand for return of Czechoslovak gold taken by the Germans in World War II and now in U.S. custody, have been avoided by Prague media since the Dubcek era.* A Prague broadcast in English on 9 July keyed to Secretary Rogers' visit only vaguely recalled that Strougal in the POST interview had noted "a certain improvement" in U.S.-Czechoslovak relations and "confirmed the interest of Czechoslovakia in continuing this development, a seemingly quite natural one."

* A CTK report of Deputy Foreign Minister Ruzek's press conference with Czechoslovak and foreign journalists on the 9th did not mention his statement, reported by the West German DPA, urging a compromise providing for the return of about 28 out of a total of 45 tons of gold in U.S. custody.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

MOSCOW SAYS DETENTE DICTATES NEW EFFORTS FOR SOCIALIST UNITY

In the wake of the U.S.-Soviet summit, Moscow has taken pains to reassure its allies that an opening to the West does not reduce but, on the contrary, enhances the need for cohesion within the socialist community. Moscow had shown little direct concern about ideological implications of the new relationship with the West in the immediate aftermath of the Brezhnev visits to Bonn, Washington, and Paris. But its concern about the impact of that course on bloc unity has recently come to the fore. As an adjunct to this effort, Moscow has attacked the Chinese with renewed vigor and implied that the Sino-Soviet polemic should serve as a rallying point for bloc unity.

An article on the importance of international communist unity by Soviet historian I. Zarodov in the 10 July PRAVDA provided the most explicit Soviet treatment of these issues. The article, available to date only in a summary by Moscow radio, asserted that "in modern conditions, with the prospect of extensive internationalization of the forces of production . . . the international solidarity and unity of the ranks of the communist and workers' movement are becoming a matter of increasing urgency." Characteristically, Moscow's closest allies in East Europe have been even more forthright in advocating a unified front against attempts by exponents of Western ideology to make inroads in the new period of increased interchange. An article by Ferenc Varnai on the U.S.-Soviet summit in the latest issue of the theoretical journal of the Hungarian party, TARSADALMI SZEMLE, warned that socialist countries will now be confronted with new dangers: the capitalist world will attempt to link the socialist countries to its market and technology and will attempt to take advantage of expanded relations for increased infiltration of bourgeois ideology. The author concluded that the proper antidote was to be found in increased cohesion of the socialist community and strengthened relations with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese angle in the renewed emphasis on bloc unity was presented most authoritatively by Podgornyy, during his recent visit to Bulgaria. In a speech on 7 July, he sharply criticized the Chinese, portraying them as the most zealous opponents of Soviet detente initiatives and of socialist cohesion. That the Romanians and other potential mavericks in East Europe are the unspoken targets of the attacks against the Chinese was most

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apparent in the Zarodov article's criticism of those who propagate "the idea that full independence is perhaps the main source of a party's strength." An editorial article on China in the Bulgarian party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 3 July, the eve of Podgornyy's arrival, argued for continued vigorous criticism of the Chinese and their positions on international and ideological issues. The article concluded that "the ideological unity of the international communist and workers' movement can be strengthened only in the struggle against its ideological adversaries, only if the movement clearly draws the line between itself and anti-Marxist, antisocialist ideological and political trends."

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U S S R

MILITARY HAILS SUMMIT POLICY, STRESSES PARTY LOYALTY

In a reversal of the cautious attitude it displayed in the months preceding the summit, the Soviet military has taken a strong stand in recent weeks in support of the regime's current detente policies. While a show of solidarity was to be expected in the afterglow of the summit, the current display seems to go well beyond the requirements of convention. It appears aimed at indoctrinating military personnel in the practical implications of the regime's current policies, with a view to averting the morale problems that a relaxation of international tensions might entail. As such, it appears to reflect a new determination by the military leadership to prevent the emergence of differences between the army and the regime.

Prior to the summit, public endorsements of the regime's detente policy by military spokesmen had been perfunctory at best, and usually counterbalanced by warnings about the continuing dangers on the international horizon and the undiminished need for vigilance. But this damning with faint praise seemed to fall out of style as the summit approached. Judging by RED STAR's saturation coverage of the Brezhnev visit, military support for the summit policy was as unqualified and enthusiastic as that of any other segment of Soviet society. Since then, RED STAR has continued to comment favorably on the results of the visit. In its editorial on 3 July, for example, it gave unqualified endorsement to the summit policy, praising the "courage, far-sightedness, and painstaking efforts" that the leadership had devoted to it.

The determination of the military leadership to maintain this attitude is underscored by Defense Minister Grechko's speech to the military graduates, reported in RED STAR on 3 July. Stressing party loyalty (partiynost) as the supreme criterion of an officer's duty, Grechko reminded the graduates that the foreign policy that the regime was now pursuing was based on the resolutions of the 24th party congress and that it had been approved by the April plenum. Asserting that party loyalty meant intolerance of political indifference, he went on to tell the graduates that they should evaluate all their actions, as well as the actions of their fellow officers and subordinates, in terms of the "interests of the Communist party, the Soviet state, and the Soviet people." In their formal response to these remarks, the student representatives echoed these themes, giving what amounted in effect to a pledge of allegiance to the party's current policy. Last year, in his speech to the graduates, Grechko had not mentioned "party loyalty."

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Further evidence of the military leadership's support for the regime's detente policies is the publication in RED STAR on 4 July of a major theoretical article on peaceful coexistence. Authored by Dmitry Tomashevskiy, head of the international department of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and an avowed advocate of improved East-West relations, the article presents a closely reasoned rationale for the regime's current policies. Based in part on an earlier article by the same author,* the RED STAR article argued that there is no rational alternative to peaceful coexistence and that the failure to achieve it could result in "grave calamities" for mankind. It concluded with a highly favorable assessment of the regime's "peace program," stressing the "immutable" commitment of the Soviet Union to a policy of "cooperation" with all peoples.

* "The Leninist Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Class Struggle," KOMMUNIST, No. 12, 1970.

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C H I N A

CADRES TOLD TO GIVE BETTER CARE TO YOUTHS SENT TO COUNTRY

A major campaign is now evident in PRC media to make rural job assignments for educated youth more palatable to the young graduates and their parents. Mao has always been closely identified with the program to send youths to the countryside to integrate with the masses; his instructions were quoted in 1968 as authority for imposing control over youthful enthusiasm during the cultural revolution by removal to the countryside. The current emphasis on improving daily living conditions of the youths sent to the countryside and on making use of their educational specialties conforms to the regime's stance of retreating from extremes adopted during the cultural revolution period. There is no evidence of a retreat, however, in the continued campaign to send the youths out, a campaign which has received new life this year as a "revolutionary new thing" to be protected from Lin Biao's alleged attacks on it as a form of "labor reform in disguise." Instead, the easing of conditions is probably a response to continued resistance to the full revival of the program this year.

The need to make educated youth self-supporting was the major focus of an unusually detailed report, released by NCNA on 4 July, which publicized the exemplary work being done at a Hopei commune by the local county party committee. Educated youths working at the commune were said to have improved their previous situation of being unable to provide their own means of subsistence by increasing the number of days worked and earning more work points in the same way as local commune members. Added assistance was, however, provided to help the youths engage in "collective side-line occupations such as raising hogs, chickens, rabbits, growing vegetables, and running collective mess halls." Most educated youth in the commune now "have surplus money" with "nothing to worry about."

The commune also paid attention to providing housing for the educated youth. County party leaders were applauded for initiating the construction of houses containing over a thousand new rooms for the youths. Space allocations for the educated youths are now equivalent to that available for local commune members; individuals average just less than a room with married youths moving into a room and a half.

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Differential treatment for educated youth was endorsed in the NCNA report, which noted that they are given half a day a week for their own study sessions apart from the "masses." Cadres were also urged to intensify their efforts to make "bold" use of the educated youths and to "bring their strong points into full play." Accordingly, a large number of educated youth have been selected to fill leading positions throughout the county and are working as teachers, accountants, farm machine operators and agro-technicians. Local authorities are to make yearly visits to the parents of educated youths as well as to the schools in which they studied "to get different opinions about the reeducation of the youths."

Tsinan radio on 7 July chided local authorities for shortcomings in looking after young people settling in the countryside. The broadcast turned to a Mao injunction on not overlooking personal interests of the masses to buttress its thesis that educated youth in the countryside are the "valuable treasure of the state" and that "we must pay attention to doing well in solving some of their daily problems in living." Party organizations at all levels were ordered to put such problems as meals, housing, and medical treatment for educated youth on their agenda and to be "ready to carry out inspection" on these matters at any time. Similarly, a KWANGSI DAILY editorial on 8 July urged cadres to overcome the "slanders against the rustication of educated young people" by doing "a good job in settling, educating and employing the educated young people On' in this way can the educated young people and their parents be at ease of mind."

CADRE TRAINING One spinoff of the drive to improve conditions for educated youth sent to the countryside appears to be a parallel concern for upgrading the quality of training and living conditions for the faculty at rural "7 May" cadre schools. An authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 11 July publicized the results of a conference held recently by departments under the Central Committee and the State Council on how to improve the operation of these schools. Suggesting that some of the recent arrivals at the schools for stints at manual labor in the countryside have been cadres tainted in the Lin Piao affair, the editorial placed the need to improve cadre training in the context of aiding the "eradication of the virus" of Liu Shao-chi and "other political swindlers," the codename for the still unnamed Lin.

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The schools were instructed to accomplish this objective by improving their "teaching quality." Party committees at the local levels are to make sure that the cadre school faculty is given "good support politically, ideologically and with respect to their living conditions"--"whatever they need" to accomplish their teaching duties. Necessary practical measures are to be taken to solve such problems as "the assignment of theoretical cadres" to the teaching staff and the "supply of materials and books."

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NOTES

USSR MILITARY STRENGTH: Col. Gen. Nikolay Ogarkov, first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, has refuted recent Western allegations about increases in Soviet and Warsaw Pact military strength. In an interview published in the 10 July RED STAR--available to date only in summaries carried by TASS and Moscow radio--Ogarkov termed these allegations, attributed in particular to NATO commander-in-chief Goodpastor, an attempt to obstruct the forthcoming European force reduction talks. Ogarkov, earlier a high-ranking member of the Soviet SALT delegation, has commented only sparingly in the Soviet press in recent years.

In recent months Western charges of a buildup in Warsaw Pact strength have been routinely rejected by Soviet commentators, but with the force reduction talks scheduled to open in October Moscow may have felt a more authoritative response was in order. Ogarkov specifically refuted charges of a rising Soviet military budget and an expanding naval posture. He also reiterated Brezhnev's 1971 suggestion that Moscow is "prepared to solve," on the basis of equality, issues arising from the extended naval cruises of the great powers at great distances from their own shores. Brezhnev's statement has been reiterated in Soviet journals during the last two years.

EGYPTIAN ADVISER IN MOSCOW: TASS has only briefly announced the 11 July arrival in Moscow of Egyptian President as-Sadat's adviser for national security affairs, Hafiz Isma'il, who has paid a similar visit in February. Isma'il was reported by Cairo radio as saying on his departure that he was responding to a Soviet Government invitation "extended to any Egyptian official to introduce to him" the outcome of the U.S.-Soviet summit. First announcing the visit, Cairo radio had said on the 7th that it came in the framework of continuous Soviet-Egyptian consultations and was preceded by bilateral contacts in which Cairo was informed of the outcome of Brezhnev's talks in the United States, France and West Germany. AL-AHRAM on the 11th, according to the Cairo press review, viewed Isma'il's visit as confirmation of Egypt's interest in preserving its friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but went on to say that the Arabs found it difficult to believe that consolidation of the atmosphere of detente would realize their hopes for progress and liberation.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 2 - 8 JULY 1973

Moscow (3392 Items)			Peking (1064 Items)		
Kosygin in Austria	(1%)	12%	Domestic Issues	(47%)	51%
European Security Conference	(2%)	11%	Cambodia	(4%)	19%
Brezhnev Visit to U.S.	(31%)	10%	{Sihanouk Return from Tour	(1%)	15%]
Podgornyy in Bulgaria	(--)	8%	Korea	(17%)	8%
Brezhnev Visit to France	(19%)	7%	[1st Anniversary of North-South Reunification Statement	(--)	3%]
Kirilenko in Syria	(--)	7%			
Indochina	(1%)	3%			
China	(3%)	2%	Vietnam	(7%)	6%
			[DRV Leaders in DPRK	(3%)	3%]

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.